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“The Battle-Fortune of Marshal 
Hindenburg is not Bound up with 
the Possession of a Hill”
The Germans and Vimy Ridge, April 1917 
 
h o l g e r  h e r w i g
Abstract : On 9 April 1917 four Canadian divisions and one British division 
of 170,000 men broke through the “Vimy Group” of German Sixth Army 
of some 40,000 men. By late afternoon, the Germans had been driven off 
the Ridge. That day, as Brigadier-General Alexander Ross famously put 
it, constituted “the birth of a nation.” Rivers on ink have been spilled 
in the Canadians’ actions that day, but little attention has been paid to 
“the other side of the hill.” Which German units defended the Ridge? 
What was the quality of their leadership? Why did the defence collapse 
so quickly? Why did the German soldiers not break and run? And how 
were they able to prevent a deeper British-Canadian breakthrough? On 
the basis of German sources, this article seeks to provide answers to 
those questions.
The 100Th anniversary of the Battle of Vimy Ridge is almost upon us. Canada’s most celebrated military victory—
spectacularly immortalized in the massive limestone memorial on 
Hill 145 at Vimy Ridge—has taken on mythological proportions 
ever since Brigadier-General Alexander Ross famously stated that 
the battle  constituted nothing less than “the birth of a nation.”1 
Historians have seen it as the coming of age of the young nation, as 
1  Daria Coneghan, “Ross, Alexander (1880-1973),” The Encyclopedia of 
Saskatchewan, in esask.uregina.ca.html, accessed on 4 June 2016.
© Canadian Military History 2016
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its first bold step to emerge from out of Britain’s shadow. And since 
the battle took place on Easter Monday, contemporary Canadian 
“poets of every stripe” linked it to the “resurrection of Christ”; and 
from there it was, in the words of the historian Jonathan Vance, only 
a small step to connect Vimy with “the birth of a nation.”2 It is not 
my goal either to uphold or to challenge that assertion, but rather 
to offer what all too often is missing in Canadian accounts of Vimy: 
“the other side of the hill.”3 For as Carl von Clausewitz succinctly put 
it almost 200 year ago, “War . . . is not the action of a living force 
upon a lifeless mass . . . but always the collision of two living forces.”4
First, the Great War needs to be set into some geographical and 
demographical context from the German perspective. One tends to 
view the German Empire of 1914 as a gigantic juggernaut of power, 
land, men, and money. But at about 557,000 square kilometres it 
was roughly 100,000 square kilometres smaller than Alberta. Its 
opponents—even before the United States entered the conflict—
controlled a land mass of some 78 million square kilometres. And in 
terms of population, while the Reich’s 67 million certainly outranked 
that of Canada (under 8 million), it was paltry compared with the 
aggregate population of its three main adversaries, Britain, France, 
Russia and their empires: 760 million.
These raw figures made clear even to a layman before 1914 that 
any future war for Germany (and its moribund ally, Austria-Hungary) 
would have to be short and decisive (read, the Schlieffen Plan).5 A 
war of attrition was not Germany’s trump suit. Despite countless 
peacetime war games that stressed mixed-arms and group tactics, 
flexibility and maneuver, the Imperial German Army, constituted 
as such only on 4 August 1914, advanced in traditional fashion: 
shoulder-to-shoulder in massed waves of gray-clad infantry. The result 
was not surprising: 143,000 battle deaths in 1914; the figure rose to 
628,000 by 1915 and then to 964,000 by 1917. Again, simply by way 
2  Jonathan Vance, “Battle Verse: Poetry and Nationalism after Vimy Ridge,” in 
Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment, ed. by Geofrrey Hayes, Andrew Iarocci, and 
Mike Bechtold (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), 265-66.
3  An exception is Andrew Godefroy, “The German Army at Vimy Ridge,” in Vimy 
Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment, 225-38.
4  Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 77.
5  For a superb recent analysis, see The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives 
on the German Strategy for World War I, ed. by Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, 
and Gerhard P. Gross (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014).
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of comparison: there were roughly 60,000 Canadian fatal casualties 
between 1914 and 1920. German military historians have calculated 
that units on average lost roughly one-third of their combat strength 
every year. After the twin attrition battles of Verdun and the Somme 
in 1916, the German Army of 1914 no longer existed. Its best non-
commissioned officers had died; college graduates, quickly promoted 
to the rank of second lieutenant, had taken their place. Replacements 
basically meant convalescents. And Reserves. So it was at Vimy.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
In terms of German strategy on the Western Front, Vimy Ridge 
played almost no role. The new Third Supreme Army Command 
(Oberste Heeresleitung, or ohl) of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg 
and General Erich Ludendorff had taken stock of the dire military 
situation at the end of 1916 and decided that the Empire could spare 
neither men nor guns in 1917; the tank was empty. Some 350,000 
soldiers had been killed in 1916, and another 1.4 million wounded. 
Hospitals were strained to the limit with 3 million casualties. Roughly 
130,000 men had been “combed” out of rear echelon industrial 
and administrative posts for service at the front, and the 310,000 
men born in 1889 had already been called to the colours ahead of 
schedule. Thus, when Colonel-General Ludwig von Falkenhausen, 
commanding Sixth Army near Arras, suggested an attack against 
Vimy ridge. [Map by Mike Bechthold, © 2006 Canadian Military History]
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the British-Canadian lines around Souchez, Ludendorff vetoed the 
plan.6 The German armies would spend the coming year in defensive 
positions, consolidating and recovering from the battles of the Somme 
and Verdun (almost half a million casualties each), and training in 
the new defensive doctrines being formulated by Bavarian Captain 
Hermann Geyer and Lieutenant-Colonel Max Bauer (more on this 
later), leaving the hoped-for victorious offensive to the Navy and its 
U-boats. The land forces were to be reconstituted and “modernized” 
for a decisive campaign in 1918. For the time being, all resources, 
including half a million military, civilian and pow labourers, toiled 
to straighten out a 20-mile bulge in the so-called “Ancre knee,” 
a line running from Lens to Reims via Royon. Dubbed Operation 
Alberich after the malicious king of the dwarves in the ancient 
Germanic Nibelungen saga, it was an audacious gamble.7 Ludendorff 
surrendered 2,600 square kilometres of hard-won French territory. 
Therein, he laid waste to every village, street, creek, tree, well, and 
rail line—or, at least those left undestroyed by the 1916 Somme 
battles. And in the war’s greatest feat of engineering, he deployed 
1,250 supply trains of forty freight cars each to haul concrete and 
steel for the construction of five major defensive lines, collectively 
called the Siegfried Stellung (Hindenburg Line to the Allies).
It was an open secret that the Entente at a meeting in Chantilly 
on 16 November 1916 had laid down a comprehensive, coordinated 
land strategy for 1917: while Russia mounted a “large-scale action” 
against Bulgaria, Britain and France would launch a “grand-style 
attack” in the West.8 Sound on paper, the plan never materialized. 
On 12 March 1917 Prince George Lvov led a Cabinet revolt against 
Tsar Nicholas II, who was removed from power in favour of his 
brother, Grand Duke Michael. Furthermore, General N. V. Ruzsky, 
commander of the Northern Front, reported that his soldiers were in 
open revolt and that his army had been reduced to a “militia.” Still, 
at London on 16 January 1917 the Allies pressed on with their plans 
6  Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914-1918, (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried 
Mittler und Sohn, 1919), 332.
7  For a brief description see Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and 
Austria-Hungary 1914-1918, (London, New Delhi, New York, Sydney: Bloomsbury, 
2014), 247-48.
8  The texts of both meetings are in History of the Great War: Military Operations, 
France and Belgium, 1917, Appendices, (London: Imperial War Museum, 1992), 1-3, 
16-17.
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for a “powerful offensive” on the Western Front,  for they had found 
a new star in French General Georges Robert Nivelle—he did speak 
English, after all.
Nivelle, the hero of the recapture of Fort Douaumont at Verdun 
in 1916, had no doubts as to his ability to end the war quickly. 
“Objective: Total destruction of active enemy forces by maneuver 
and battle.”9 To accomplish that, Nivelle proposed a two-pronged 
offensive in the West: the French with fifty-two divisions and 4,800 
guns, and “without chance of failure,” would storm the southern 
Aisne sector in the Champagne, to which the Germans had just 
laid waste in Operation Alberich. Meanwhile, the British with fifteen 
divisions and 2,800 guns would stage diversionary offensives around 
Arras, between Vimy and Bullecourt, to prevent the Germans from 
reinforcing the Champagne sector. Not surprisingly, then, in German 
documents of the time and in subsequent histories, the Entente spring 
offensives of 1917 are always referred to as “the twin battles of Arras 
and the Champagne.” Nivelle assured politicians and commanders 
alike that after an assault of no more than forty-eight hours, his 
combat troops would have ripped through (percée) the German Aisne 
front in depth; his Reserves would have exploited that yawning gap 
to mop up German batteries and supply depots; and thereafter the 
French Army would have broken out into open warfare.10 
To be sure, there were doubters in the Allied camp. Field Marshal 
Douglas Haig had no desire to launch yet another prolonged battle; 
his true aim was to shift the bulk of his forces to Flanders, and to 
drive toward Ostend and Zeebrugge, in the process capturing the 
Belgian coast and reducing the German U-boat menace. General 
Alfred Micheler, commander of Reserve Army Group and the man 
Nivelle had chosen to command the major assault on the Aisne, like 
Haig feared another prolonged battle. He doubted the likelihood of 
a breakthrough, given that the Germans had withdrawn significant 
forces from the Noyon salient to buttress their position on the 
Aisne. General Henri-Philippe Pétain, commanding Central Army 
Group and brutally honest as ever, rejected Nivelle’s certainty that 
the artillery could destroy the enemy throughout a deep defensive 
9  Cited in Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in 
the Great War (Cambridge MA, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2005), 325.
10  See ibid., 324-25. 
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position, and he feared that Nivelle was attacking on too broad a 
front in the Champagne. He instead favoured a strategy of limited 
gains. “Even the waters of Lake Geneva,” he lectured Minister of 
War Paul Painlevé, “would have but little effect if dispersed over 
the length and breadth of the Sahara Desert.”11 All to no avail. The 
politicians in London (Prime Minister David Lloyd George) and in 
Paris (Premier Alexandre Ribot) had faith in Nivelle. On 9 April 
1917 Haig launched the Battle of Arras—a week before Nivelle struck 
on the Aisne. And three days after the United States had entered 
the war, largely as a result of Germany’s renewal of unrestricted 
submarine warfare.
What of the two opposing armies at Vimy? Of Field Marshal 
Haig’s British Expeditionary Force, two armies are of particular 
interest to the student of Vimy Ridge. Just east of Arras were 
positioned the 350,000 men of Sir Edmund Allenby’s Third Army, 
and directly on and slightly west of Vimy Ridge stood Lieutenant-
General Sir Henry Horne’s First Army of 320,000 men and 1,100 
artillery pieces. As is well known, First Army included Lieutenant-
General Sir Julian Byng’s Canadian Corps, composed of one British 
11  Cited in E. L. Spears, Prelude to Victory (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939), 346.
general ludwig von Falkenhausen, the new governor-general of Belgium (second from the 
left), on board refloated steamer Gneisenau off Antwerp, June 1917. [© iwM (Q 23992)]
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and four Canadian divisions, with an amazing nominal strength of 
170,000 soldiers.12
Arraigned against them was General von Falkenhausen’s Sixth 
Army of 12 divisions and 1,016 artillery pieces. Falkenhausen had 
divided his Army into five so-called “corps groups.” Two are of 
immediate interest with regard to Vimy. Between Givenchy and 
Loos, Falkenhausen sited General Georg Wichura’s “Group Souchez,” 
composed of VIII Reserve Corps (56th Infantry Division, 80th 
Reserve Division and 16th Bavarian Infantry Division). From St. 
Laurent to Givenchy, Falkenhausen sited General Karl Ritter von 
Fasbender’s “Group Vimy” composed of I Bavarian Reserve Corps 
(1st Bavarian Reserve Division, 14th Bavarian Infantry Division 
and 79th Prussian Reserve Division).13 Raw figures for the number 
of divisions should not obscure the fact that Canadian divisions on 
paper numbered about 19,700 ranks, while their German opposites 
numbered but 11,600. As will be shown later, many of the German 
12  The overall strength of the Canadian Army in April 1917 was 17,802 officers and 
283, 494 other ranks. See G. W. L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-
1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War (Ottawa: Roge 
Duhamel, 1962), 547.
13  Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. 
Die militärischen Operationen zu Lande, vol. 12: Die Kriegführung im Frühjahr 1917 
(Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1939), 210.
lt.-gen. Sir Julian Byng, g.o.C. Canadians, May 1917. [library and Archives Canada PA-001284]
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divisions at Vimy had recently gone through the hell that was the 
Somme.
A veteran of the Franco-Prussian War, General von Fasbender 
had served as Chief of the Bavarian General Staff and had commanded 
several infantry divisions before his retirement in 1912. Reactivated 
at the start of the war, then Lieutenant-General von Fasbender led 
I Bavarian Reserve Corps as it stormed through Douai and Lens 
during the misnamed “race to the sea.” He marveled at the beauty of 
the land: rich clover and beet fields, marvelous stone manor houses, 
quaint villages.14 But around Lens, the landscape took on a less 
attractive appearance: coal mines, slag heaps and industrial plants. 
The closer the Reserve Corps came to Vimy, the more vicious became 
the fighting. “The village battles are truly terrible,” Fasbender wrote 
in his war diary. “We have to conquer the houses one by one, drag 
the enemy out of cellars and sheds, or kill them by throwing hand-
grenades down at them.” And the greater became the destruction: 
“All churches . . . are destroyed, all roofs torn off, walls caved in, 
entire houses bared to the elements. People and animals lie about, the 
barns are empty, cows roam about lowing; none are fed, watered or 
milked because no one has remained in the village.”
On 6 October 1914 the I Bavarian Reserve Corps stormed Vimy 
Ridge—where its advance was halted by Major-General Pétain’s 
XXXIII French Corps. Ironically, Fasbender and his Corps would 
return to Vimy Ridge in February 1917. It was not an enviable 
command. Already in November 1914, Fasbender had noted: “This 
campaign has developed into a sort of siege warfare, without really 
being siege warfare and without us having the tools of siege warfare.”15 
Nothing had changed by early 1917. Misery was the common 
denominator for Germans and for Canadians alike that winter, which 
turned out to have been the coldest of all four war winters.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
Many of German Sixth Army’s infantry units had been hastily 
summoned from the trenches of Artois and Flanders in February 
and March 1917 in anticipation of the British assault at Arras. 
14  Karl Ritter von Fasbender, Kriegstagebuch, 3 and 5 October 1914, 12-14, 19, 
Handschriften Sammlung 2212, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv-Kriegsarchiv, Munich.
15  Ibid. Entry for 7 November 1914, 19.
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Lieutenant-General Roderich von Schoeler’s 11th Infantry Division, 
for example, spent the summer and fall of 1916 in trench warfare 
on the Somme. Lieutenant-General Otto von Rauchenberger’s 14th 
Infantry Division was stood up only in August 1916 and immediately 
deployed at Verdun; in November it was dispatched to the Somme. 
Both of General von Fasbender’s Reserve units—Major-General 
Ernst von Reuter’s 18th Reserve Division and Major-General 
Theodor von Wundt’s 17th Reserve Division—spent the summer in 
trench warfare on the Somme and the fall in similar conditions at 
Ypres. Thus it is unsurprising that many of Sixth Army’s formations 
were designated by the ohl as being “burned out,” “exhausted” and 
“skeletal” after the Somme battles.
Of Fasbender’s three infantry divisions, five regiments were sited 
on the narrow 700 to 1,000-metre-deep German strip at the top of 
Vimy Ridge, 145 metres above the Douai Plain. They had been under 
intense enemy artillery fire since February 1917, and in constant 
rain that turned the shell craters and trenches into a quagmire.16 
Conditions only deteriorated, as witnessed in countless soldiers’ 
diaries at the Bavarian Military Archive in Munich.17 Winter rains. 
Fog. Sleet. Hail. Snow. Ice. Heavy enemy artillery bombardment. 
Most of the men abandoned shelled-upon villages and slept in the 
mud and snow of open fields. On the Ridge, the Germans faced 
devastating torpedo mines. Endless tunneling. The metres-thick 
walls of the trenches collapsed, often burying the men alive. Fat rats 
ran across their sleeping bodies or feasted on the dead. The men’s 
attempts to repeat the Christmas truces of the previous two years 
were quashed by their officers. In January and February, I Bavarian 
Reserve Corps daily noted dramatic increases in bombardments and 
especially in Canadian patrols, sniper activity, and sapper tunneling. 
The men were fatigued from hauling shells and trenching materials 
up the Ridge. Nonetheless, Sixth Army headquarters reported the 
Vimy divisions, “despite the effects of recent days,” to be “capable of 
turning back a large assault.”18
Although one often reads of the vaunted German elastic defence 
in depth at Vimy, this is not, in fact, the case. As already noted, the 
16  Der Weltkrieg, 211-12.
17  The numerous diaries that I have consulted over the past two decades are in the 
Handschriften Sammlung (HS) of the Bavarian Military Archive.
18  Der Weltkrieg, 212.
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narrowness of the German position at the eastern edge of the Ridge 
and the deep down-slope behind it allowed no such deployment, either 
in depth or in elasticity. While some of the unit commanders had 
spent the winter months in training centres around Sedan learning 
the new defensive doctrines devised after the terrible months at the 
Somme, those concepts were still new and untried. Many senior 
front-line officers, foremost among them General von Falkenhausen 
of Sixth Army, rejected the notion of elasticity and instead demanded 
that the men hold every inch of territory—and if not, regain it by 
counter-attack as soon as possible. Thus he anchored his defence on 
immovable strong points and “hard” lines of resistance. At Vimy, he 
set up three static defensive lines. The First Line on the Ridge was 
500 metres deep and consisted of a network of trenches protected 
by barbed-wire entanglements, elaborate redoubts, dug-outs, tunnels 
and ancient caves dug into the chalk and sand, and some concrete 
machine-gun emplacements. The Second Line, just below the crest 
east of the Ridge, featured fortified dug-outs, underground shelters, 
and more woven belts of wire. The Third Line, still farther east, 
wound down the Douai Plain from Lens to Arras in front of the small 
villages of Méricourt and Oppy and was studded with well-fortified 
A soldier amidst the ruins of the Arras-lens front, ca. April-May 1917. [Bundesarchiv Bild 
104-02757]
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positions.19 For our purposes, it is vital to remember that discussion, 
disagreement and confusion about the new defensive system were 
widespread among front-line commanders on the eve of the Battle of 
Vimy Ridge.20
But what were the new defensive tactics? Officially titled 
“Principles of Command for the Defensive Battle in Position Warfare,” 
Captain Geyer’s blueprint called for a defence that featured both 
depth and elasticity.21 The aim was “to husband one’s own forces” 
while allowing the enemy to “exhaust himself and to bleed” heavily. 
What Geyer called “machines of war” (artillery, trench mortars, 
machine guns, flame throwers, and hand grenades) were to spare the 
blood of soldiers, soon to be dubbed the “workers of war.” “Depth” 
in the defensive system translated into abandoning the old linear 
trench system roughly 2 kilometres deep in favor of a killing zone that 
ranged between 9 and 12 kilometres in depth. Three lines of defence 
were established and deployed much in the way as squares on a chess 
board, each anchored on its own steel-reinforced concrete bunkers with 
artillery and mortars. “Elasticity” was achieved by having the First 
Line resist an enemy attack only as long as was feasible and then to 
“evade” the main assault, drawing the adversary into a Second Line 
battle zone dominated by machine-gun nests with interlocking zones 
of fire. Third Line troops would, if need be, counterattack an invader 
in small groups of combined arms units (storm troops). The new 
doctrine of decentralization and individualization prescribed that the 
division become king of the battlefield: it would combine and control 
its own artillery, infantry, airpower, communications, and resupply. It 
was elevated to near independent status and given control over all its 
assets—land and air, men and material. And it was to man a front 
of no more than 2,500 to 3,000 metres.
Reserve formations were critical. They were to be sited within 
easy marching distance of the front lines, and they were to be 
19  For a good description, see Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 246; and 
History of the Great War: Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917, vol. I, pt. 
1, The German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the Battle of Arras, comp. by 
Captain Cyril Falls (London: Imperial War Museum, 1992), 305.
20  Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern, Mein Kriegstagebuch, ed. by Eugen von 
Frauenholz (Munich: Deutscher National Verlag, 1929), vol. 2, entry for 9 October 
1917.
21  Hermann Geyer, Gesamteindrücke der Westreise, Januar 1917, Nachlass Hermann 
Geyer, RH 61/924, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (hereafter BA-MA), Freiburg.
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trained in the new storm-troop tactics. Special three-month training 
courses throughout the fall and winter of 1916 were to instil Geyer’s 
new defensive warfare into commanders. But Ludendorff could not 
quite go all the way: in the end, he insisted that the deployment of 
Reserve formations and any decision to abandon battle land could be 
requested by an Army Commander, but ordered only by the Army 
Supreme Command.22 The Battle of Vimy Ridge would show the 
error of his ways.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
At 5:30 a.m. on Easter Monday, 9 April 1917, a British-Canadian 
hurricane bombardment from some 900 guns and mortars rained 
down on the German front line from Givenchy to Neuville-Vitasse, 
defended by seven infantry divisions.23 Vimy Ridge itself, as stated 
earlier, was held by five German regiments, with companies on average 
down to but seventy-to-eighty men each. In all, according to the 
British History of the Great War, the German regiments comprised 
a rifle strength of about 5,000 men.24 At 6 a.m. wave after wave of 
15,000 mostly Canadian infantrymen (equivalent to the entire 1911 
population of Restigouche, New Brunswick) advanced under the fire 
cover of a massive creeping barrage. Smoke shells and flamethrowers 
went into action next. Lieutenant Gregory Clark, commanding 4th 
Canadian Mounted Rifles’ 15 Platoon found it a thrilling experience. 
“It was a beautiful sight. It was still quite dark. Sleet was falling.” 
But it was also “the edge of hell. It blazed, flashed and flickered, the 
bursting shells.” The soldiers advanced through “an infernal wall of 
twisting, boiling smoke and flame.”25 The inadequacy of the German 
defence mounted by Falkenhausen’s Group Vimy on the top of the 
Ridge was soon revealed. British and Canadian high-explosive and 
gas shells had killed many of the German draft animals and hence the 
22  The new defensive system has been superbly analyzed with reference to 11th 
Bavarian Infantry Division by Christian Stachelbeck, Militärische Effektivität im 
Ersten Weltkrieg. Die 11. Bayerische Infanteriedivision 1915 bis 1918 (Paderborn, 
Munich, Vienna, Zurich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010), 169-71. Also, Bruce I. 
Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918 
(New York, Westport, London: Praeger, 1989).
23  Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 252 ff.
24  Falls, History of the Great War, 317.
25  Cited in Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918 
(Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008), 123.
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batteries on the Ridge quickly ran out of shells. No counter-battery 
fire. No artillery to support a possible counter-attack. Moreover, 
communications between the front and the rear echelon had been 
blown to smithereens. The alternating rain, fog, clouds, and snow 
prevented critical aerial spotting for the artillery.
The thin German line holding the eastern Ridge crumbled 
quickly.26 Bavarian first and second lines were overrun in the first 
hours of the assault. By 9 a.m., 14th Bavarian Infantry Division 
had been driven off the Ridge down to the railroad embankment 
at St. Laurent; in the words of the Bavarian Official History, the 
Division consisted of “nothing but pitiful debris.”27 Thélus had to be 
abandoned next. By 11 a.m., the right wing of 79th Prussian Reserve 
Division had been thrown back to its Third Line in the valley; its left 
wing to its Second Line; and its centre down the crest of the Ridge. As 
the Canadians drove 14th Bavarian Infantry Division off the heights, 
Fasbender’s position became untenable and he was forced to order 
his I Bavarian Reserve Corps off the Ridge. The Germans lost the 
commanding heights of Telegraph Hill at noon. One hour later Hill 
93 (by the Point du Jure) was also in enemy hands. Major-General 
Friedrich von Pechmann’s 1st Bavarian Reserve Division abandoned 
Farbus by 1 p.m. and only halted its retreat east of the Ridge in its 
Third Line at Vimy Village. The unit had lost 300 officers and 3,000 
men that 9 April; it had abandoned thirty artillery pieces.28 It, along 
with 14th Bavarian Infantry Division, would take the major blame for 
the debacle at Vimy Ridge.
The only bright spots for the Germans on 9 April were but 
two: that of the eight tanks that had accompanied 2nd Canadian 
Division, three had been destroyed by gunfire and the rest stuck in 
the sea of clay mud; and that once the skies had cleared, Manfred 
von Richthofen (the Red Baron) scored kills 38 to 55 over and around 
Vimy that “Bloody April.”29
26  Given the near total destruction of German military records by Allied bombing 
in April 1945, the best accounts remain with the official German and Bavarian 
histories: Forschungsanstalt des Heeres, Der Weltkrieg, 212 ff.; and Bayerisches 
Heeresarchiv, Die  Bayern im Grossen Kriege 1914-1918, auf Grund der Kriegsakten 
dargestellt (Munich: Verlag des Bayerischen Kriegsarchivs, 1923).
27  Die Bayern im Grossen Kriege, 367.
28  Ibid., 369.
29  Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 213.
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The face of battle, as the historian John Keegan famously called 
it, is well known and hence three diary entries, one Canadian, one 
French and one German, might well serve our purpose. Private 
Adelbert F. Brayman, 50th Battalion (Calgary) of the 4th Canadian 
Division, was wounded storming Hill 145 at Vimy. He remembered 
the ferocity of the battle:
From the very first minute of the attack we came under murderous and 
hellish fire from the machine guns . . . we lost about 30 per cent of the 
fighting forces before we got into [the enemy’s] green line of trenches and 
went into hand-to-hand fighting. . . . As we looked back up that ridge 
in the early dawn we witnessed a scene never to be forgotten. The entire 
face of the hill was covered with German green and Canadian khaki. 
Men lay out there in that blood-soaked field, some dead, some dying.30
A young French baker from Burgundy named René Jacob wrote his 
parents from the battlefield near Soissons as follows:
How can one describe it? What words to use? Corpses everywhere. 
Black and green corpses. Corpses in strange positions: a knee jutting up 
into the air, or an arm resting against a trench wall. Corpses that one 
has to cover with chalk or straw, or dirt and sand. The ground covered 
with their entrails. Corpses that one buries or burns. A terrible smell,  
a smell as from a charnel house, rises up and chokes us. . . . I spoke to 
you earlier of a battlefield; no, it is more like a slaughter yard. Not even 
the wind that blows across the Ridge can disperse the stench of death.31
On the German side of the Ridge at Giessler Heights, Hermann 
Bauer with 14th Bavarian Infantry Regiment wrote home in much 
the same vein:
Has all hell broke loose? An ear-splitting din and roar goes on unabated, 
and already the first 15mm shell bursts into the south wall of the [sand] 
pit. A trench wall collapses, but there is no time to think. . . . And the 
[snow] flakes fall much like shell splinters. They tear all life into shreds. 
We all suck in our breaths. . . . The Tommys have broken through. 
30  Cited in Cook, Shock Troops, 143.
31  Cited in Michael Epkenhans, Der Erste Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Paderborn: 
Ferdinand Schöningh, 2015), 91-92.
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Now, come on you Canadians! Suddenly they burst forth from Sand Pit 
2; they disdain any ground cover, these Canadian storm troops. They 
seem to believe that their hellish [artillery] fire has demoralized and 
buried us.32
For German commanders, this was the immediate and obvious 
question: what had gone so terribly wrong? First, the relatively 
brief British-Canadian hurricane bombardment had caught them off 
guard. Attacking after shelling the enemy for only four days had not 
been the British way. Obviously, the enemy had also learned (and 
applied) the lessons of the Somme. Second, the troops in the Second 
Line of defence had been designated only as replacement forces for 
the First Line; no one had thought of using them within hours of 
an enemy assault to come to the rescue of that front line.33 Third, 
German Reserve units had been held too far back from the fighting 
front—in many cases as much as 20 kilometres—and thus could not 
relieve the hard-pressed units up on the Ridge. Many still tarried in 
the partly-finished Wotan (or Drocourt-Quéant) Line and, despite 
the use of rail and motor transport, would not arrive at Vimy Ridge 
32  Das Bayernbuch vom Weltkriege 1914-1918. Ein Volksbuch, ed. by Konrad Krafft 
von Dellmensingen (Stuttgart: Chr. Belser, 1930), 408-09.
33  Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 214.
The village of oppy burns under artillery fire, May 1917. [Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1974-051-22]
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until the next day. Too late to counter-attack. And finally, battlefield 
conditions: darkness, a snow storm and the ubiquitous chalky mud 
forced all operations to a halt on the night of 9 April.
On 10 April Lieutenant-General Karl Dieffenbach, commanding 
Group Arras south of Vimy Ridge, sent a sobering report of the past 
twenty-four hours to General Headquarters. “Situation unfavorable; 
heavy losses; much artillery lost. Shell shortage. [Enemy] fire much 
heavier than in the Battle of the Somme.”34 Telegraph Hill lost. Thélus 
and Hills 93 and 94 in enemy hands. The 79th Reserve Division 
had been badly knocked; 11th Infantry Division was being rushed 
into theatre to take up position around Vimy. It would eventually 
suffer 3,200 casualties there. Words such as “burned out,” “debris” 
and “slag” were applied to many German formations in front-line 
reports. Fasbender by late morning on 9 April had recommended a 
5-kilometre withdrawal of his three divisions being ground off Vimy 
Ridge to the line Méricourt-Arleux-Gavrelle. Falkenhausen and his 
chief of staff, Major-General Karl von Nagel zu Aichberg, dismissed 
the recommendation out of hand. Instead, they canvassed the 
commanders of Groups Souchez, Vimy and Arras for their input—
34  Ibid., 220.
ludendorff. [library of Congress lC-
B2- 5240-7]
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and then asked the ohl for permission for Sixth Army to launch 
a counter-offensive against British forces around Arras. Ludendorff 
passed the request on to Lieutenant-General Hermann von Kuhl, 
Chief of Staff to Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, 
who quickly vetoed Falkenhausen’s plan, arguing that the Allies 
would pre-empt and smash such an attack with a new offensive of 
their own.35 Falkenhausen had no option but to bow to the obvious: 
during the night of 12-13 April he ordered a total withdrawal of 
German forces from Vimy to the line Lens-Avions-Méricourt-
Acheville-Arleux-Oppy, some 7 to 8 kilometres east of the Ridge and 
part of the Siegfried Stellung south of Arras (Fasbender had made 
that recommendation a day earlier!).
Rescue for the Bavarians came in several forms. First, the Allied 
assault did not resume until 4 p.m. on 10 April. Second, by then, 
reserves had begun to arrive at Vimy. The 18th Prussian Infantry 
Division shored up the front of the badly knocked 14th Bavarian 
Infantry Division; 17th Prussian Infantry Division that of 1st Bavarian 
Reserve Division; and Prussian 11th Infantry Division that of 79th 
Prussian Reserve Division. Defence of the last lines at Vimy Village 
was secured by Major-General Arthur von Gabain’s 17th Prussian 
Infantry Division36 (a bitter pill for the Bavarians to swallow!).
But if there was a hero on the German side, he was, in fact, 
Bavarian: Karl von Fasbender. Almost 65 years of age in 1917, the 
former retiree was still on top of his game. He had recognized the 
British buildup around Arras and had warned the ohl of this five 
days before the assault at Vimy Ridge. To no avail. He had recognized 
the magnitude and the speed of the Canadian attack on the morning 
of 9 April. To no avail. Well before noon that day he had counselled 
a withdrawal to the Third Line along the railroad embankment at 
Vimy Village. Again, to no avail. He had kept his reserves in the 
line for as long as he could, and never blamed them for their defeat. 
And from 14 April to 20 May 1917, he held the new German front 
on the Douai Plain against ferocious Allied attacks emanating from 
the heights of Vimy. In one of those rare moments in history where 
valour is truly rewarded, Field Marshal Crown Prince Rupprecht 
of Bavaria made certain that Fasbender received Bavaria’s highest 
military honour, the Grand Cross of the Military Max-Joseph Order.
35  Ibid., 225.
36  Ibid., 222.
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◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
General Ludendorff at once launched an investigation into the Vimy 
debacle.37 There was no question that it had been a major defeat. 
A complete surprise. An embarrassment. Seven divisions—mainly 
those from Group Vimy and Group Souchez directly in the path 
of the British-Canadian assault on 9 April—had been beaten so 
soundly that they had to be relieved at once. As well, the right flank 
of the Siegfried Stellung was exposed to British assault. The affected 
divisions had lost 23,000 men, two-thirds euphemistically listed 
as “missing.” And the major French blow on the Aisne was yet to 
come! Ludendorff dispatched staff officers to Vimy and called theatre 
commanders to his headquarters at Kreuznach for interrogation. How 
to explain a bulge 18 kilometres wide and up to 6 kilometres deep 
driven into the German line in just three days? Had the new Geyer/
Bauer defensive doctrine proved fallible? Had the officers not learned 
the doctrine properly? Or had there been a failure of command?
Major-General Alfred Dieterich, commanding 79th Reserve 
Infantry Brigade, later elucidated the tactical mistakes committed 
at Vimy. The defensive First Line on top of the Ridge had been 
“insufficiently planned,” with the most robust dug-outs sited 
“mistakenly in the first line.” None were able to withstand the 
withering British-Canadian artillery bombardments. And the Second 
Line “was out of the question for a longer defence” because of its 
“unfavourable position at the foot of the eastern slope.”38 Once the 
Canadians had broken through the German First Line on 9 April, the 
game was lost for Sixth Army.
It was time for lessons learned. On 13 April the ohl listed three 
major causes of failure. First, several divisions had collapsed simply 
because they had not yet regained their fighting strength from the 
terrible Somme battles. Second, the reserves had not been called up 
to the front lines in timely fashion. Third, sufficient artillery had not 
been deployed against the enemy. After further study, Ludendorff 
concluded that the two main causes of defeat had been the failure 
to call up the reserves (especially those from the Second Line) once 
the magnitude of the attack had been recognized, and the failure 
37  Ibid., 234.
38  Alfred Dieterich, “The German 79th Reserve Infantry Division in the Battle of 
Vimy Ridge, April 1917,” Canadian Military History:  15, 1 (2006),  72.
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to engage the heavy guns at once. (Comparatively speaking, each 
battery of 10th Bavarian Artillery Regiment on 9 April had fired 
roughly 1,500 shells.) Ludendorff ruled out failure on the part of the 
soldiers: “The bravery of our troops remains firm.”39
But someone had to pay the price. Captain Geyer’s “Principles” 
of December 1916 had been clear: “If something goes wrong, we will 
arraign regimental commanders before courts-martial or dismiss 
General Staff officers, even before replacements for them can be 
found.”40 Thus, Ludendorff cashiered General von Falkenhausen 
(going on age 73) as commander of Sixth Army and Major-General 
von Nagel as chief of staff. They had failed to recognize the size, the 
speed and the power of the British-Canadian attack, and thus had been 
surprised and overrun at Vimy. Only a timely and early withdrawal 
from the rain and snow-soaked Ridge, as advocated by General von 
Fasbender, could have spared Sixth Army its ignominious defeat. 
Ludendorff dispatched Falkenhausen to Brussels to command a desk 
39  Der Weltkrieg, 235. Ludendorff’s conclusions were based in large measure on the 
findings of the new, hastily-appointed chief of staff of Sixth Army, Colonel Fritz von 
Loßberg, his “lion of the defensive”. See Meine Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914-1918, 
(Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1939), 283-84, 288.
40  Geyer, Abwehr, RH 61/924 262, BA-MA; and Stachelbeck, Militärische 
Effektivität, 179.
Anti-aircraft guns during the battle of Arras, ca. April-May 1917. [Bundesarchiv Bild 183-
r41681]
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as Governor-General of occupied Belgium, and Nagel to Romania to 
command a trench division on the Siret River.
The German Official History, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, went 
further: it blamed the ohl equally for the debacle.41 There had been 
failures. No one at headquarters had recognized the size of the enemy 
deployment around Arras; only Fasbender, the I Bavarian Reserve 
Corps commander at Vimy, had. The construction of the Siegfried 
Stellung in that sector had led to a false sense of security. Heavy 
batteries had been removed from Group Vimy for two weeks of rear-
echelon training. The power of the enemy assault—nearly twice as 
many heavy guns and five times the amount of heavy shells expended 
as on the first day of the Somme offensive on 1 July 1916—had come 
as a total surprise. As late as 30 March, Ludendorff and his staff had 
let it be known that the pending British attack was still two to three 
weeks away. When they recognized their miscalculation on 5 April, 
it was too late. While Captain Geyer’s new defensive doctrine proved 
its value along the overall front, with specific reference to Vimy Ridge 
the narrowness of the terrain (less than 1,000 metres) simply had 
not allowed for an elastic defence in depth. And all too many units 
had been taken out of Flanders and Artois too hastily and deployed 
at Arras without proper rest and recuperation as well as retraining.
Left out in both the studies of the Third Army Supreme Command 
and of the Official History were several systematic failings. The 
reorganization of the Imperial German Army into new “army groups” 
had caused massive confusion. Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht 
of Bavaria, for example, made up of former Fourth, Sixth, First, and 
Second Armies, had been set  up (at least on paper) only on 1 March 
1917. Many corps and divisions had been given new commanders, 
and different regional formations (Bavarian, Prussian, Saxon, 
Württemberg) had been haphazardly thrown together.42 Second, the 
bold strategic withdrawal of troops to the Siegfried Stellung (Arras-
St Quentin-Soissons) had not begun until 16 March, three weeks 
before the Arras offensive. Soldiers had been used as construction 
workers and many had not yet returned to their units by 9 April. The 
41  Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 236-38.
42  The standard work remains Hermann Cron, Geschichte des Deutschen Heeres im 
Weltkriege 1914-1918 (Berlin: K. Siegismund, 1937); in English translation, Imperial 
German Army, 1914-18: Organisation, Structure, Orders of Battle (Solihull, West 
Midlands: Helion, 2002).
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Canadian assault thus struck at a time of critical reorganizational 
chaos in the Reich’s military structure in the West. 
Still, the German Official History concluded its analysis of the 
Battle of Vimy Ridge with a positive spin. Whereas up to now enemy 
gunners had known the precise German positions and thus had 
been able to target them mercilessly, the withdrawal to the rolling 
countryside east of the Ridge evened the score: now attacker and 
defender alike had to deal with new and uncertain topographical 
realities. Its final verdict: “Thus the significance of the great British 
[sic] initial success in terms of the overall front remained operationally 
limited to insignificant territorial gain.”43 The soldiers at Vimy in 
1917, both Canadian and German, I suspect, would have had some 
trouble with this verdict, penned in 1939.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
The obvious question as always: why did the common soldier keep on 
fighting? Research into this central issue has largely been neglected 
in Germany. Military sociology, so studiously analyzed with regard 
to “Fighting Power” especially in the United States after 1945, 
remains the stepchild of German military history.44 Most writers 
point to the obvious: patriotism, love of nation, honor of Kaiser and 
Empire, defence of wife and child and hearth against an evil enemy. 
Discipline. Following orders. Unit cohesion. Camaraderie. Hatred of 
staff officers and headquarters. Pride in one’s self. Pride in one’s 
particular region (in this case Bavaria). The hope that just one more 
“push” would bring an end to the war. And the obvious rewards and 
inducements: leave, special rations, commendations, medals, sexual 
refreshment behind the lines. Also, as we know from Ernst Jünger’s 
recently published unabridged memoirs, the liberal use of alcohol.45 
And, what was the alternative to fighting on? Desertion had its 
own dangers. Where to? To the South, the Swiss border was closed 
43  Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 239.
44  A first comprehensive investigation stemmed from Hans Paul Bahrdt, Die 
Gesellschaft und ihre Soldaten: Zur Soziologie des Militärs (Munich: C. H. Beck, 
1987). It largely followed Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of 
Soldiers in Battle (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982), commissioned by the Canadian 
Department of National Defence.
45  Ernst Jünger, Kriegstagebuch 1914-1918, ed. by Helmuth Kiesel (Stuttgart: 
Klett- Cotta, 2010).
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and well guarded. To the East, rear-echelon patrols were only too 
eager to sweep up deserters and send them to labour battalions. 
And to the West, the enemy: running toward his lines with one’s 
hands up in the air was no guarantee of survival. It never ceases to 
amaze those of us who have for so long studied the Great War that 
also at Vimy, morale held—even among Fasbender’s Bavarian week-
end warriors. Like their Canadian regular army counterparts, they 
endured the mud, the gas, the mines, the collapsing trench walls, the 
snow, the sleet, the slaughter, and at times, the sheer boredom.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
The Battle of Vimy Ridge was downplayed in contemporary German 
official reports and newspapers as well as in subsequent accounts. 
Field Marshal von Hindenburg in his memoirs, which in fact were 
written by a staff officer with the Official History, spoke of 9 April 
1917 as constituting “a dark picture, much shade, little light.” But, 
he cheerily concluded, “what did losing a single position amount to 
in this gigantic battle when compared to the victorious mastery of 
the entire front?”46 General Ludendorff allowed that he was “deeply 
depressed” that 9 April. It had ruined his 52nd birthday! But forty-
eight hours later he casually wrote off the entire affair. “During the 
night [from 11 to 12 April] we evacuated Vimy Ridge.”47
The German Official History, based on after-action reports that 
were lost to the massive British air raid on the military archives 
at Potsdam on 14 April 1945, gave no figures—killed, wounded, 
deserted—for Vimy. Instead, using the army’s cold, clinical ten-day 
casualty reports, it simply reported the loss by Sixth Army of 20,800 
soldiers from 1 to 10 April, of 10,600 from 11 to 20 April, and of 
19,800 from 21 to 30 April 1917—a total of 51,000 men against 
78,000 “Tommys.” Thus, while lamenting the “great loss of prisoners, 
equipment and territory” on 9 April, the officer-historians of the 
Official History deemed the following three weeks to have constituted 
“a total success for the German defence.”48
46  Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben (Leizpig: S. Hirzel, 
1929), 241-42.
47  Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914-1918, 334.
48  Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 277.
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Newspapers at home were even more inventive. And invective. 
Munich’s main paper, the Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 
trumpeted what quickly became the main line of argument: that the 
Battle of Arras had been yet another “fight between the brainless 
piling up of material [Haig] and the genius [Hindenburg] who inspires 
his tools with his will and employs them according to his laws.” The 
British “war machine,” the paper reminded its readers, was the last 
resort of the coward, who in the face of superior morale and infallible 
generalship could only seek to crush the enemy under a mass of steel 
and explosives.49 It was a well-worn reiteration of the old “material-
versus-morale” argument. The capital’s Berliner Tageblatt reported 
only on the Battle of the Aisne: “One Of The Greatest Battles In 
The History Of The World,” and one in which the attackers had 
been beaten back. It also briefly noted what it called “Various Minor 
Attacks Turned Away” elsewhere.50 So much for British First and 
Third Armies. And so much for the Canadian Corps. In fact, only 
the Frankfurter Zeitung paid even indirect attention to Vimy Ridge: 
“The battle-fortune of Marshal [Hindenburg] is not bound up with 
the possession of a hill.”51 Period.
The repeated references to the German overall “total success” 
and to the “mastery of the entire front” in the West are revealing. 
For, what did the loss “of a hill” mean in the grander scheme of the 
Nivelle Offensive (the twin battles of the Champagne and Arras)? 
Five Entente divisions had stormed Vimy Ridge, defended by three 
German divisions; 53 French and British divisions later assaulted 
the Aisne sector defended by 38 German divisions. Roughly 10,600 
Canadians (including 3,600 killed) had bled at Vimy; some 134,000 
poilus (including 30,000 killed) had paid the price for Nivelle’s folly 
on the Aisne.52 At Vimy, Generals von Falkenhausen and von Nagel 
had adamantly clung to the customary system of a rigid and static 
defense; on the Aisne, Ludendorff adopted Captain Geyer’s concept 
of the “Defensive Battle in Position Warfare.” Thus, the German 
arguments ran, the debacle at Vimy Ridge was but one small side of 
49  http://hdp.daviesmeyer.com/Home/Deutsche-Geschichte-im-Spiegel-der-Presse/
Der-erste-Weltkrieg/1917, accessed 20 April 2016.
50  Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung, 17 April 1917, 1.
51  Cited in John Frank Williams, Corporal Hitler and the Great War 1914-1918: 
The List Regiment (London, New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 166.
52  Figures according to the French Historical Services; cited in Doughty, Pyrrhic 
Victory, 334.
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a much larger campaign; and it was easily dismissed as one of simple 
human failure.
To be sure, the positive spin put on the Battle of Arras by the 
German media is hardly surprising. The General Staff kept a tight 
rein on information, issuing battle reports to but ten Austrian, 
German and Hungarian reporters officially accredited to the ohl. 
The safety of its front-line troops, the General Staff allowed, could 
only be guaranteed by such strict control over information and 
publication. One of the ohl’s most banal communiqués, Im Westen 
nichts Neues (“In the West Nothing New”), of course became the 
title of Erich Maria Remarque’s wildly famous war novel, with the 
English-language title All Quiet on the Western Front (1928).
But what about the German Official History? Why the postwar 
positive spin even on defeats? The answer lies in the origins of 
the future Reichsarchiv, which eventually produced the fourteen 
volumes of the official history of the war. In July 1919 Major-General 
Hans von Seeckt, a brilliant operations officer and the founder of 
the Reichswehr under the Weimar Republic, laid down the ground 
rules for the Official History. First off, there were to be no “private 
individuals” involved in the project—read, university professors such 
as Hans Delbrück, Friedrich Meinecke and Hermann Oncken who 
had been even mildly critical of the General Staff in the Great War. 
After all, Seeckt reminded the Cabinet of Chancellor Gustav Bauer, 
these mandarins “worked only for themselves,” and “only in a limited 
german troops in the ruins of givenchy. [Bundesarchiv Bild 146-2008-0066]
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sense for the state, [and] often against it.” In the well-established 
tradition of the Prussian General Staff, the Official History was to be 
written completely by former and current officers. Ranks were closed, 
reputations upheld. The “prestige” of the army was to be “protected 
at all cost.” Finally, the “morally, psychologically and physically 
broken Volk” needed to have faith in itself restored. That would 
be the primary function of Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. It, and it 
alone, Seeckt argued, could “revive the memories of the grand deeds 
during the world war.”53 The tomes written and published after 1933, 
beginning with volume 9, naturally had to pass National-Socialist 
muster and constituted what the historian Markus Pöhlmann called 
a “remilitarization” of the Official History project.54 The new elite 
of Adolf Hitler’s Wehrmacht, men who had served at Verdun and 
the Somme mostly in the rank of captain, were not to be exposed to 
criticism of that epic war.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
Finally, there remains one of history’s delicious “what-if” scenarios. 
After his injury at the Somme in October 1916 and his two-month 
recovery at home from a shrapnel wound in the upper leg (possibly 
with the loss of one testicle), Adolf Hitler—by his own report—was 
returned to his old unit the first week of March 1917, the 16th 
Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment, often simply called the “List 
Regiment” after its first commander, Colonel Julius von List. The 
Regiment, badly shaken by the physical and psychological demands 
of the Somme fighting, had been stationed in what was regarded 
as a “quiet sector,” Vimy Ridge. Hitler arrived there the first week 
of March 1917 to join his outfit. But then, in one of those strange 
twists of history, the unit was inexplicably separated from its parent 
formation, the 16th Bavarian Infantry Division at Givenchy, and 
moved a dozen miles north to La Bassée, where the ohl expected 
53  Seeckt’s memorandum of 12 July 1919, Bundesarchiv-Berlin, R 1506 (Reichsarchiv), 
Nr. 41, 101-07. Cited in Markus Pöhlmann, Kriegsgeschichte und Geschichtspolitik: 
der Erste Weltkrieg. Die amtliche deutsche Militärgeschichtsschreibuung 1914-1956 
(Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2002), 70-71. Italics in the original.
54  Ibid., 151 ff.
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the main British attack.55 Had the relocation of the 16th Bavarian 
Reserve Infantry Regiment not taken place, or had it been delayed by 
even four weeks, the men of the Canadian Corps might have spared 
the world the horrors of a second world war and the Holocaust.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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